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The Meaning of TerrorismJurisprudential and Definitional
Clarifications
Louis Rend Beres*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines contemporary definitions of
terrorism and determines that they are inadequate. The
author describesfive specific types of problems with current
definitions and offers an appropriatescholarly remedy. This
Article concludes, inter alia, that the United States should
reject narrow, geopolitical definitions of terrorism. Instead, it
should articulate and apply a single unambiguous standard
that incorporates the requirements of just cause and just
means. Absent evidence of these two elements, the insurgent
use of force should be regarded as terrorism. This clearer
and more objective definition will enable the United States to
approach and address adversarial uses of force in a more
effective manner.
Despite the increasingly large volume of publications
addressing terrorism, it is regrettable that little if any serious
progress has been made in suitably distinguishing terrorism from
other uses of force in world politics and from other related crimes
Indeed, judging from the standard
under international law.'

*Professor of International Law, Department of Political Science, Purdue
University. Professor Beres is the author of fourteen books and numerous
articles about terrorism and international law.
1.
Part of the problem here is the conglomerate nature of the- crime of
terrorism. For example, Congress has made terrorism in the United States and
abroad subject to criminal prosecution in United States courts. One statute is

directed toward aircraft hijackers, regardless of where the terrorist activity occurs.
See Aircraft Sabotage Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. XX, pt. B, 98 Stat. 2187
(1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 31-32 (1994)). Another statute
imposes punishment for hostage-taking, wherever located, if either the terrorist or
the hostage is a United States citizen, or if the purpose is to influence the United
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definitions of terrorism currently in professional use-defimitions

that offer no operational benefit for scholars or practitioners-the
term has become so broad and so imprecise that it embraces even
the most discrepant activities.
For example, under certain
prevailing definitions of terrorism adopted by United States
government agencies and some scholars, the United States War

for Independence, the Gulf War (Desert Storm), the Contra

insurgency in Nicaragua,

and the anti-Castro

insurgency

supported by the United States 2 are all examples of terrorism.
The following is a
3
definitions of terrorism:

list of typical official

and

unofficial

.. . the unlawful use or threatened use of force or
violence by a revolutionary organization against
individuals or property with the intention of coercing or
intimidating governments or societies, often for political
or ideological purposes." (U.S. Department of Defense).

1.

2.

'.

. . the unlawful use of force or violence against persons
or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the
civilian population, or any segment thereof, in
furtherance of political or social objectives."
(U.S.
Federal Bureau of Investigation).

3.

".

. . premeditated,
politically motivated violence
perpetrated
against
noncombatant
targets
by
subnational groups or clandestine state agents."4 (U.S.
Department of State).

4.

"... violent criminal conduct apparently intended: (a) to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(b) to
influence the conduct of a government by intimidation
or coercion; or (c) to affect the conduct of a government
by assassination or kidnapping." (U.S. Department of
Justice).

States government. See Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Hostage-Taking, 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1994). Yet another statute makes terrorist
assaults or murders of United States nationals a crime, wherever the event takes
place. See Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 896 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (1994)).

2.

The anti-Castro insurgency supported by the United States is also in

violation of the United States Neutrality Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1994).
3.
These definitions are found in R. Kidder, Unmasking Terrorism: The
Fear of FearItself, in VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM 14 (B. Schechterman & M. Slann
eds., 3d ed. 1993).
4.
An authoritative source seems to have used this definition as the basis
of a definition of international terrorism. See James P. Terry, Legal Aspects of
Terrorism, in INIERNATIONAL MILITARY AND DEFENSE ENCYCLOPEDIA 2732 (1993)
(defining international terrorism as "the premeditated, politically motivated
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets in or from a second state by
subnational groups or individuals").
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. . the unlawful use or threat of violence against
persons or property to further political or social
objectives. It is usually intended to intimidate or coerce
a government, individuals or groups or to modify their
behavior or policies." (The Vice President's Task Force
on Combatting Terrorism).

5.

".

6.

"Terrorism is the deliberate employment of violence or
the threat of the use of violence by subnational groups
and sovereign states to attain strategic and political
objectives. Terrorists seek to create overwhelming fear
in a target population larger than the civilian or military
victims attacked or threatened. Acts of individual and
collective terrorism committed in modem times have
introduced a new breed of extralegal 'warfare' in terms
of threats, technology, targets, and impact." (Author
Yonah Alexander).

What is wrong with these definitions? First, although a few
of the definitions attempt to demarcate between lawful and
unlawful uses of force, the reader must determine which criteria
of legality should be applied. Are the references to national law
criteria? Are the references to international law criteria? Do they
refer to both criteria? Once the applicable criteria of legality are
determined, the pertinent criteria under national or international
5
law still remain unclear.
Second, the above-listed definitions of terrorism, which make
no explicit reference to legality, 6 also omit the essential elements

5.
Under national law, pertinent penal provisions (such as murder,
assault, theft, the illegal detention of persons, the taking of hostages, and arson)
normally contain no actual reference to terrorism and are applicable despite any
reference to terrorism. Under international law, criteria of lawfulness are more or
less present in pertinent treaty provisions, but these criteria are one step removed
from judgments regarding terrorism.
Accordingly, the analyst must first
understand that terrorism is a conglomerate crime under international law and
then must understand which particular penal components constitute terrorism.
Even with such understanding, authoritative contradictory expectations,
especially in regard to standards ofjust cause, may still confound analysis.
6.
The definitions of terrorism that do explicitly refer to legality do not, in
any effective or identifiable way, include the elements of just cause and just
means.
Although it is conceivable that these elements may somehow be
embedded in the reference to legality, no one can ever know for certain. Hence,
definitions of terrorism that contain references to lawful or unlawful force are
assuredly not per se more useful than definitions without such references.
Indeed, definitions that do contain references to legality may be more problematic
because they display a certain circularity not evident in other definitions.
Terrorism here is defined, inter alia, as unlawful force, and unlawful force is
defined, in turn, as terrorism.
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of "just cause" (jus ad bellum)7 and "just means" (jus in bello).8
These indispensable elements distinguish permissible from

impermissible insurgencies under international law.9

Moreover,

in view of the supremacy of some international law over national

or domestic law, 10 these elements are relevant whichever realm of

7.
The principle of just cause maintains that an insurgency may justify
the exercise of law-enforcing measures under international law. This argument is
deducible from the existence of an authoritative human rights regime in
international law and from the corollary absence of a central enforcement
mechanism for this regime. It is codified, inter alia, in the Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee on InternationalTerrorism, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 1,
U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973). See also Art. 7 of the U.N. General Assembly's 1974
Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at
144, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 710, 714 (1974). Article 7
refers to the October 24, 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States. G.A. Res. 2625,
25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970), reprinted in 9
I.L.M. 1292 (1970).
8.
The standard of just means has been brought to bear upon non-state
actors in world politics by Article 3, which is common to the four Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949, and by the two protocols to these Conventions.
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members
of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec.
12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (hereinafter Protocol I); Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 606
(hereinafter Protocol II). Protocol I applies humanitarian international law to
conflicts fought for self-determination. Protocol I, supra. Protocol I, which was a
product of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts that ended on
June 10, 1977, brings irregular forces within the full scope of the law. Id.
Protocol II addresses the protection of victims of non-international armed
conflicts. Protocol II, supra. Protocol II thus applies to all armed conflicts that
are not covered by Protocol I and that take place within the territory of a state
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces. Id.
9.
Although it may appear at first that definitional references to political
motives or objectives satisfy the just cause criterion because these references
seek to exclude ordinary criminality as a motive for insurgency, this view is
exceedingly problematic because antecedent definitional questions concerning
precise meanings and parameters of the word "political" and various associated
issues of fact remain unresolved.
10.
According to Article VI of the United States Constitution:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
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law or combination of realms is implicitly under consideration.
Without the elements of just cause and just means, a definition of
terrorism necessarily includes both permissible and impermissible
forms of insurgency." x Such a definition of terrorism is useless.
The third problem with the above-listed definitions of
terrorism is that the definitions that refer to "threatened use of

force or violence" or "threat of violence"

never establish

identifiable thresholds of threat. When, exactly, is the threat
sufficient to argue convincingly for the presence of terrorism? In
the absence of settled, unambiguous thresholds, inclusion of the

word "threat" within the definition can serve only propagandistic
or geopolitical purposes.
Fourth, the above-listed definitions that do not refer
specifically and exclusively to insurgent organizations broaden the
meaning of terrorism to unmanageable and operationally useless
levels. As a crime under international law, 12 terrorism cannot be
committed by states qua states.' 3 This exclusion is very sensible
because the alternative would lead to an unwieldy conceptual
expansion-a blending of terrorism with other related

Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONSr. art. VI. In the Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), the
Supreme Court declared:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction ....
For
this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and
usages of civilized nations....

Id. Thus, customary international law is also incorporated into United States
common law, although subject to being overridden by subsequent statute or

treaty. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); L. Littlejohn & Co. v.
United States, 270 U.S. 215 (1926).
11.
Under international law, of course, not all uses of insurgent force are
terrorism. Just cause for the inalienable right to self-determination and for the
enjoyment of peremptory human rights is an integral part of customary and
conventional norms. The right of insurgency is affirmed, inter alia,in the first part
of the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence of the United States
(a document that qualifies as lawmaking under the authoritative provisions of
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice). But insurgency is
unlawful, irrespective of just cause, if the means used fail to satisfy just means
criteria. For example, if the use of force is indiscriminate, disproportionate, or
beyond the codified boundaries of military necessity, the insurgency is unlawful.
12.
An authoritative listing of offenses that constitute the crime of
terrorism can be found in the European Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism, Nov. 10, 1976, Eur. T.S. No. 90, reprintedin 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976).
13.
Terrorism, of course, can be supported by states.
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crimes 14-and a consequent dilution of the crime. Moreover, in
the simultaneous absence of precise just cause and just means
criteria on the use of force, virtually all force exercised by
governments could conceivably be construed as terrorism.
Fifth, the definitions listed above that refer to political

violence or objectives fail to demarcate clearly the boundaries of
politics.
When exactly is violence unambiguously political?
What, indeed, is the difference between political violence and
ordinary criminal violence? As a jurisprudential matter, these
questions have existed for a long time, especially in connection
with the international law of extradition i s and the 16pertinent
criteria of the "political offense exception" to extradition.
Today, some states conclude that politically motivated
violence, by definition, cannot be terrorism. Under this view, acts
of violence that are committed on behalf of national liberation,
self-determination, or anticolonialism fall outside the definition of
terrorism. Hence, "[u]nder this approach, sending letter bombs
through the mails, hijacking airplanes, kidnapping or attacking
diplomats and international business people, and indiscriminate
slaughter of civilians could never constitute terrorism if the
17
revolutionary groups committed them on behalf of a just cause."

14.
For example, terrorism could be blended with aggression.
See
Resolution of the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess.,
Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprintedin 14 I.L.M. 588 (1975).
15.
The "extradite or prosecute" formula, which should be applied more
systematically to crimes of terrorism, derives from the peremptory norm of nullum
crimen sine poena ("no crime without a punishment"). Developed in antiquity, this
formula has roots both in natural law and in positive law. See JEAN BODIN, THE
SIX BOOKES OF A COMMONWEALE (Kenneth D. MacRae ed., Richard Knolles, trans.,
1962) (1576); HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLIS AL PACIS LIBRI TRES (Francis W.
Kelley, trans. 1925): EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES
OF NATURAL LAW (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. 1916) (1758). The
norm of nuilum crimen sine poena distinguishes between criminal and non-

criminal law. Without punishment, there can be no distinction between a penal
statute and any other statute. See Redding v. State, 85 N.W. 2d 647, 652 (Neb.
1957) (concluding that a criminal statute without a penalty clause is of no force
and effect).
16.
The "political offense exception" permits a state to refuse an
extradition request from another state if the offense charged in the request is of a
"political nature." For an excellent treatment of this principle, see Christopher L.
Blakesley, The Practice of Extradition From Antiquity to Modem France and the
United States: A Brief History, 4 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 39 (1981). See also
CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
PRTECTION OF HUMAN LIBERTY 75-89 (1992).
17.
See John F. Murphy, Cooperative International Arrangements:
Prevention of Nuclear Terrorismand the Extraditionand Prosecutionof Terrorists, in
PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM 361 (Paul Leventhal & Yonah Alexander eds.,
1987). This book represents the Report and Papers of the International Task
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From the standpoint of international law, this approach ignores
that the criterion of just cause' 8 is always augmented by the
As already noted, the just means
criterion of just means.
standard has been made applicable to insurgent resorts to force
by Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and by
Protocols I and II of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions.
Furthermore, the Martens Clause of the 1899 and 1907 Hague
Conventions confirms that ". . . civilians and combatants remain
under the protection and authority of the principles of
international law derived from established custom, from the
19
principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience."
Indeed, even if the authoritative extensions of humanitarian
international law represented by the Geneva Conventions and
Protocols had not been enacted, the Martens Clause would apply
in many circumstances.
It must also be understood that all law is rooted in natural
law and that natural law could never countenance violence
against the innocent as permissible. Cicero's classic expression of
natural law in De Republica clearly indicates why politically
motivated violence by insurgents must be unlawful if the
of
discrimination,
obligations
the
ignore
insurgents
proportionality, and military necessity dictated by "right reason:
True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal
application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its
commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions.... It
to repeal any part
is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable
20
of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely.

For more than two thousand years, natural law has served as
the ultimate standard of right and wrong, of lawfulness and
unlawfulness. In Sophocles' Antigone and Aristotle's Ethics and
Rhetoric, the principle of natural law-tied closely to theology for

Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism and includes a chapter by the author,
Louis Ren6 Beres, a participant in the Task Force.
18.
Moreover, it is by no means certain that all politicaliy motivated
violence is necessarily expressive of national liberation, self-determination, or
anticolonialism objectives-the only objectives properly associated with just
cause. Likewise, it is not certain that national liberation, self-determination, and
anticolonialism are necessarily expressive ofjust cause in all circumstances.
19.
The Martens Clause, named after the Russian delegate at the first
Hague Conferences, is included in the Preamble of the 1899 and 1907 Hague

Conventions. The Clause is designated a higher status in Protocol I, in which it is
included in the main text of Article I. See Protocol I, supranote 8. In Protocol II,
the Martens Clause was again moved to the Preamble. See Protocol II, supranote
8. The Martens Clause extends the law of armed conflict to all types of liberation

wars.
See MARCUS T. CICERO, THE REPUBLIC: BOOK III, reprintedin SOCIEY,
20.
LAW, AND MORALrIY 35-36 (Frederick A. Olafson ed., 1961).

246

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL. 28:239

many centuries-placed law above lawmaking. At the same time,
it is obvious that humankind has not only been generally
indifferent to the law of nature, but has often coupled this
indifference with adherence to so-called laws that reject justice.
This phenomenon is evident, inter alia, in the use of the word
"political" to excuse terrorism and to exclude from the realm of
terrorism a number of resorts to insurgent force that are simply
not excludable under natural law.
We live at a moment in history in which the realm of politics
and the realm of crime are interpenetrating, overlapping, and
even interchangeable at times. For example, who killed President
Kennedy, "terrorists" or "criminals"?
The interrelationship
between politics and crime was understood by St. Augustine at
the beginning of the fifth century. In City of God, St. Augustine
described human history as a contest between two societies, the
intrinsically debased City of Man and the eternally peaceful City
of God. St. Augustine characterized the former society as little
more than "a large gang of robbers."2 1 In an oft-quoted passage,
St. Augustine set forth a conversation between Alexander the
Great and a captured pirate. When asked by Alexander what
right the pirate had to infest the high seas, the pirate replied,
"The same right that you have to infest the world. But because I
do it in a small boat I am called a robber, while
because you do it
22
with a large fleet you are called an emperor."
Of course, even if the concept of terrorism were suitably
clarified
and
improved,
unless
the
states
in world
politics-especially
major
states
such
as
the
United
States 23-begin
to take their counterterrorism responsibilities
seriously, the benefits of clarification and improvement of the
definition of terrorism will be moot. For example, the recent
United States validation of the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) regarding the Oslo agreement with Israel 2 4 and the

21.
See LOUIS REN8 BERES, PEOPLES, STATES, AND WORLD ORDER 114-15
(1981) (discussing St. Augustine's political philosophy); see also GEORGE H.
SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 308 (1961) (discussing St. Augustine's
pertinent phrase: "highway robbery on a large scale").
22.
BERES, supranote 21, at 115.
23.
The argument for special or enlarged major power responsibility is
based on codifications expressed in nineteenth and twentieth century peace
settlements and international organizations-particularly the role of permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council-and is deducible from the more
or less persistently decentralized authority structure of international law.
24.
See Louis Rend Beres, International Law Requires Prosecution, Not
Celebration,of Arafat, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 569 (1994).
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2s
subsequent Nobel Prize celebration of PLO leader Yasser Arafat
fundamentally undermine the obligatory war against terrorism
and indicate that the United States is not taking its
counterterrorism responsibilities seriously. 2 6 Therefore, scholars
must do their part to refine the terrorism concept, 2 7 and political
leaders must also do their part in honoring2 8the incontrovertible
commands of national and international law.

See Louis Rend Beres, No Peace-Or Prize--Without Justice, USA
25.
TODAY, Oct. 17, 1994, at 10A.
In addition to crimes of terrorism, Yasser Arafat gave his blessing to
26.
crimes of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity committed by
Saddam Hussein during the 1991 Gulf War. Units of the Palestine Liberation
Army served with Hussein's forces in occupied Kuwait, making them-and Arafat
personally--complicit in multiple crimes of extraordinary horror and ferocity. On
the principle of command responsibility, or respondeat superior, see In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); United States v. Von Leeb ("The High Command
Case"), 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 1, 71 (1949); Major William H. Parks,
Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1973); William V.
O'Brien, The Law of War, Command Responsibility and Vietnam, 60 GEO. L.J. 605
(1972); U.S. DEPT OF THE ARMY, ARMY SUBJECT SCHEDULE NO. 27-1 (GENEVA
CONVENONS OF 1949 AND HAGUE CONVENTION NO. IV OF 1907) 10 (1970). The
direct individual responsibility of Yasser Arafat for crimes is clear in view of the

authoritative 1945 London Agreement denying defendants any right to the act of
state defense, a right which would be even more unavailable for the leader of a
See Agreement for the Prosecution and
non-state insurgent organization.
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
For writings by the author on the terrorism concept, see Louis Rend
27.
Beres, Terrorism and InternationalLaw, 3 FLA. INT'L L.J. 291 (1988); Louis Rend
Beres, TERRORISM AND GLOBAL SECURITY: THE NUCLEAR THREAT (2d ed., 1987); Louis
Rend Beres, Confronting Nuclear Terrorism, 14 HASTINGS INrL & COMP. L. REV. 129
(1990); Louis Rend Beres, The United States and Nuclear Terrorism in a Changing
World. A JurisprudentialView, 12 DICK. J. INT' L. (1994); Louis Rend Beres, On
InternationalLaw and Nuclear Terrorism, 24 GA. J. INTL & COMP. L. (1994); Louis
Rend Beres, International Terrorismand World Order: The Nuclear Threat, 12 STAN.
J. INT' STUD. (1977); Louis Rend Beres, Terrorism and International Security: The
Nuclear Threat, 26 CHITrY'S LAW JOURNAL 73 (1978); Louis Rend Beres, Hic Sunt
Dracones: The Nuclear Threat of International Terrorism, 9 PARAMETERS: J. U.S.
ARMY WAR COLLEGE 11 (1979); Louis Rend Beres, International Terrorismand World
Order: The Nuclear Threat, in STUDIES IN NUCLEAR TERRORISM 360-78 (Augustus R.
Norton & Martin H. Greenberg eds., 1979); Louis Rend Beres, Is Nuclear Terrorism
Plausible?, in NUCLEAR TERRORISM: DEFINING THE THREAT 45-53 (Paul Leventhal &
Yonah Alexander eds., 1986); Louis Rend Beres, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism:
Responses to Terrorist Grievances, in PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM 146-59 (Paul
Leventhal & Yonah Alexander eds., 1987); Louis Rend Beres, Responding to the
Threat of Nuclear Terrorism, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: CHARACTERISTICS, CAUSES
CONTROLS (Charles W. Kegley Jr., ed., 1990); Louis Rend Beres, The Threat of
PalestinianNuclear Terrorism in the Middle East, 15 INTL PROB. 48 (1976).
The generic imperative to punish crimes under international
28.
law-crimes that include terrorism-was reaffirmed in Principle I of the
Nuremberg Principles (1946): "Any person who commits an act which constitutes
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For the United States, both of these complementary
expectations are drawn from a higher law tradition. Deducible, in
turn, from a still-earlier tradition of natural law, the tradition of a
higher law is one of the enduring and canonical principles in the
history of the United States. According to Sir William Blackstone
in his celebrated Commentaries, United States leaders are
expected, in all circumstances, "to aid and enforce the law of
nations, as part of the common law: by inflicting an adequate
"29
punishment upon offenses against that universal law. ...
Understood in terms of terrorism, higher law imposes a distinct
legal obligation on the United States to oppose and punish
terrorist crimes. Even apart from its higher law obligations, the
United States is fully bound by international law as expressed in
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and
reaffirmed by various decisions of the United States Supreme
Court.3 0
During the Cold War, both United States and Soviet leaders
accepted a narrow, geopolitical definition of terrorism. The United
States characterized any insurgent force operating against an
allegedly pro-Soviet regime as lawful,3 1 regardless of the means
used in the insurgency. Reciprocally, any activity by an insurgent
force operating against a pro-United States regime was
automatically characterized as terrorism.
The Soviet leaders

believed that the United States was using the term "terrorism" to
discredit what the Soviets alleged were legitimate movements for
self-determination and associated human rights.
Under the
Soviet view, insurgency against what the United States freely
called authoritarian regimes-for example, the regimes in El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Chile-was not terrorism, as the United
States had maintained, but national liberation.
For the future, the United States, as the sole remaining
superpower, must reject altogether any narrow, geopolitical
definition of terrorism. Aware that the Cold War is now over and

a

crime

under international

law is

responsible

therefore

and

liable

to

punishment."
29.

See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *73.

30.
See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also Tel-Oren
v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam)
(Edwards, J., concurring) (Judge Edwards concurred in the majority's dismissal of
the action but made several references to domestic jurisdiction over
extraterritorial offenses), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); Von Dardel v.
U.S.S.R., 623 F. Supp. 246, 254 (D.D.C. 1985) (stating that the "concept of
extraordinary judicial jurisdiction over acts in violation of significant international
standards has also been embodied in the principle of "universal violations of
international law").
31.
"Freedom fighting" was the operative term.
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that the settled jurisprudential criteria discussed above are
consistent with its own incontrovertible norms and traditions, the
United States should immediately begin to articulate and to apply
a single set of standards to insurgent resorts to force. If a resort
to force is supported by both just cause and just means, the use
of force should be recognized as permissible. However, if the use
of force lacks either just cause or just means, the use of force
32
should be recognized as terrorism and opposed.
This recommendation is offered for pragmatic operational
reasons, as well as for purely academic reasons of respect for
justice and law.
Once government officials and pertinent
enforcement agencies are better able-with the help of the work of
scholars-to distinguish between permissible and impermissible
insurgencies under national and international law, they will be
better able to allocate precious counterterrorism resources in a
rational, cost-effective way. Rather than dedicate a substantial
fraction of scarce resources in a zero-sum environment to
purposeless or counterproductive geopolitical diversions, these
officials and agencies should be positioned to focus on real
threats to safety.

32.

The opposition to such a use of force should extend beyond tactical

measures involving armed force to include criminal prosecutions within United
States federal courts. Federal courts are competent to prosecute such acts
because federal law confers jurisdiction "to try any person who, by the law of war,
is subject to trial by a military tribunal .... " 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1994) (emphasis
added). In addition, federal law grants jurisdiction to the federal district courts
for all offenses against the laws of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1994).
Since the United States was founded, the United States has reserved the right to
enforce international law within its own courts. The United States Constitution
confers on Congress the power "to define and punish piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations." U.S. CONST:
art. 1, § 8, cl. 10. Pursuant to this constitutional prerogative, the first Congress,
in 1789, passed the Alien Tort Statute, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)). This statute authorizes the
United States federal courts to adjudicate civil claims by aliens alleging acts
committed "in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States"
when the alleged wrongdoers can be found in the United States. Id. Understood
in terms of the United States obligations to prosecute terrorists or to bring
terrorists into United States courts as defendants in civil proceedings, this means
that terrorists, when in the territory of the United States, can be brought into
federal courts for civil remediation of terrorist crimes.

